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RELIGIOUS TRUTH.
BY JOHN BURROUGHS.
"When hard pressed, theological writers often take
refuge in the statement that there is some kind of evi-
dence that is superior to scientific evidence in matters
that pertain to objects of sense and experience. Thus
Dr. Temple in his Brampton lectures on the relations
between Religion and Science, says in behalf of mir-
acles, that if the student of science is to admit a breach
in the uniformity of nature, " it can only be by stepping
outside of his science for the time and conceiving the
possibility that there is some other truth beside scien-
tific truth, and some other kind of evidence beside
scientific evidence." Unless he does this he is in a
groove, and is like "the student who when he first
saw a locomotive engine looked persevering for the
horses that impelled it, because he had never known,
and consequently could not imagine any other mode
of producing such motion." But if the student did
persevere he surely found the horses at last, that is, a
real tangible force that propelled the engine, and one
that worked according to uniform law. For my part
I confess I cannot conceive of any evidence that can
be brought in support of miracles that shall not be in
its nature scientific, that is, addressed to our rational
faculties. What is this other evidence to which Dr.
Temple alludes ? He would probably say it is the
evidence that a higher will interferes and sets aside or
reverses the ordinary processes of nature ; but do we
not want evidence that a higher will does so interfere,
and must not this evidence be scientific? that is ade-
quate to convince the mind ? We can admit a breach
in the uniformity of nature only upon the same kind
of evidence as that which leads us to deny the breach,
that is evidence that appeals to reason and experience.
It must be tangible, objective evidence, and not a
theory or a groundless postulate. What proves the
interference of this higher will ? The miracle. But
what proves the miracle? The theory of the higher
will.
If there are other truths than scientific truths, and
other grounds of certitude than those apprehended by
the reason, they are not such as are available when
natural law is on trial.
But are there such other truths ? are not all truths
strictly speaking scientific truths ? If the matter is not
capable of verification, are we justified in calling it
true, no matter what our private opinion or conviction
on the subject maybe? If we ask of a thing, or a
measure, or a course of conduct, is it good or bad,
right or wrong, we appeal to the moral sense ; if we
ask of a thing is it beautiful ? we appeal to the £es-
thetic sense. If we ask of a statement or alleged oc-
currence, is it true ? we appeal to the intellectual
sense, to the reason and judgment. And there is no
other court but this that can settle the truth or falsity
of a proposition. There is no other court but this that
has to do with the truth of things.
Our religious instincts and impulses do not have
to do with the truth or falsity of a thing ; they are just
as keen and active in the presence of false gods as in
the presence of true ; our aesthetic perceptions or at-
tractions do not have to do with the truth or falsity of
things, but only with their beauty. A fable pleases
more than a history. The conscience is no guide in
detecting truth from falsehood, but in detecting right
from wrong—in separating what is good from what is
bad, and it may be trained or warped so as to mistake
one for the other. What the conscience of one man
approves that of another may disapprove. It is our
reason and knowing faculties alone that have to do
with the truth of things, and the verdict of these fac-
ulties can never change or be reversed like those of
the taste or the conscience. There can be no fashion
in science.
A theory, or a proposition, or an alleged fact may
be morally sound and good, while yet it is not logic-
ally sound and good. A sentiment is true as sentiment
but not true as science. There is no moral objection
to ^sop's fables, but if put forth as sound natural his-
tory, there would be objections to them. The New
Testament records, which more and more people in
our day find difficulty in accepting as history, are for
the most part, morally and spiritually, beautiful and
elevating, and to certain natures this is enough. But
the man of science asks are they true, not as poetry or
fable, but as history? That feeling or mental disposi-
tion that responds to fables and allegories is as genuine
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as that which enables us to detect truth from false
hood, only it cannot take its place : it belongs to a
different sphere. There is something in us that de-
lights in fables and in heroic deeds ; that rises superior
to times and circumstances, and makes the devotion
of martyrs and the triumphs of the Davids over the
GoHahs, tonic and refreshing. There are books and
poems, that ventilate and tone up a man's whole na-
ture. We are by no means summed up by our know-
ing faculties. Truth of fact and truth of sentiment
make up life, and about in the proportion of the bone
and the fleshly tissue in our systems. We may say
there is relative truth and absolute truth. All scien-
tific truth if it be truth is absolute ; it is verifiable and
must hold good at all times and places. A man's
opinion of a matter, that is, his inference from ob-
served facts, is true from his conditions and point of
view ; it is the outcome of his relations, capacity, and
antecedents ; it is modified by his temperament, his
culture, his health, his sympathies, his race, his en-
vironment and many other things. If strictly speaking
there are religious truths, truths that in no wise de-
pend upon your view, or my view of the case, they are
verifiable. What are these truths? That man has a
soul of which his body is the tenement, that the soul
survives the dissolution of the body, that there is a
heaven and a hell, that there is a personal God, that
Jesus did not belong to the human race, etc.,—these
are not truths because they are not verifiable. They
are hopes, faiths, beliefs, aspirations ; they are true to
some men and not to others ; the grounds upon which
they are held true count much with one man, and
count little with another. We speak of the sublime
truths of the sermon on the mount ; noble and sublime
sentiments they are, but not truths ; they afford con-
solation to the religious spirit, but not satisfaction to
our truth discerning faculties, and were not meant to.
Religious truths, therefore, I should say are relative
truths, and any attempt to make them fixed and ab-
solute as the creed-mongers have tried to do, must
end in failure. Truth in all subjective matters, is
not a fixed quantity ; it is something that must be
ever newly grown like organic nature herself. A recent
theological writer says that when men accustomed to
the demonstrative evidence of science "enter a prov-
ince where moral evidence rather than demonstration
prevails, they are not unnaturally inclined to suppose
that nothing in it is settled, nothing ascertained," and
very reasonably I think. Nothing can be settled ex-
cept upon demonstrative evidence
;
you may think it
settled and wake up next day to find that the floods of
new inquiry have come and set it all afloat again.
Moral evidence can settle nothing permanently ; it
may produce conviction in men's minds to-day, which
some new thought or new spirit will chafe under to-
morrow. The moral evidences of Christianity—its
wonderful growth from such obscure beginnings, the
noble lives it has inspired, its power for good in the
world, etc., have great weight, but they do not settle
the questions that vex us. Other religions have grown
in the same way, and been the inspiration of heroic
lives and the bond of national prosperity. It will not
do to say, as is so often said, that the European na-
tions owe all to Christianity ; what Christianity owes
to the quality and spirit of the European races remains
to be determined. Why did it not transform the East-
ern peoples as well ? Science has done more for the
development of Western civilisation in one hundred
years, than Christianity did in eighteen hundred.
Again, why has science not done as much for the
oriental nations? There we are; to dogmatise in these
matters is dangerous business. The factor of race, the
factor of environment, climate, geology, rivers, moun-
tain chains, variety of coast line, etc., all enter into
the problem.
The writer I have already quoted says, "Too
high demands cannot be made on theology as to the
legitimacy and scientific accuracy of its methods."
The scientific method is the same whether in the hands
of the man of science or the theologian. It is simply
proving all things and holding fast that which is true.
When Dr. Abbott treats Christianity as an evolu-
tion, does he not thereby abandon the claim that it is
a revelation ? It cannot be both. If it is an evolu-
tion, if it came logically and naturally out of what
went before, if it was a growth, a development of the
religious conscience of man, then it takes its place in
the course of historical events, and the man of science
may accept it. In that case what becomes of the
claim that it was a revelation, something that had no
relation to what went before, something interjected
into the course of mundane history from without, an
interpolation, a miraculous ray of light from out the
heavens ? Science knows evolution, but it can make
nothing of revelation. Pilot's old question, What is
truth ? is never out of date.
Ask what is the truth in mathematics, and the
answer is easy : two and two make four ; a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points; the
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, etc.
Ask what is the truth in science, and the answer comes
as promptly, though here the field is as yet only fairly
entered upon ; ask what is the truth in politics, and
here we are bound to say all men are liars ; the truth
is whatever you can convince yourself is true. Ask
what is the truth in political economy, in ethics, in
metaphysics, and lastly in religion, and the answers
are as various as the minds of men. It is certain that
it is not a fixed quantity, that it is relative and changes
as the wants and conditions of men change. We can-
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not close our minds upon the truth in these spheres
and say "I have it" any more than we can close our
hands upon the light and say " I have it." The good
and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly are relative
terms ; no fast and hard lines can here be drawn, all
is plastic, fluctuating, growing. But science draws
fast and hard lines and can alone formulate definite
truths. A friend and correspondent of Coleridge
writing for the benefit of his children said that through
the influence of that philosopher he had been able to
arrive at settled and definite conclusions upon all mat-
ters to which he attached value or interest. And then
he adds with great wisdom "When I say that I have
arrived at settled conclusions, you will not for a mo-
ment believe that my opinions can or ought to be re-
ceived by others of a totally different experience, as
truths for their minds ; still less that matters which de-
pend upon individual experience and temperament
can be permanent truths for all time." What a lesson
for us all. Every man builds or tries to build himself
a house of truth of some sort, to shelter him from the
great void, but how foolish to expect us all to build
alike or go to the same- quarry for our material; or
that our house could serve for our children for all com-
ing time. How long it will serve depends upon how
large, how well, how conveniently it is built.
Into the formation of our minds and into the con-
duct of our lives there enter truths, opinions, and sen-
timents. Four fifths of our lives are probably made
up of sentiment, that is feeling, aspiration, attraction,
repulsion, etc.; a sentiment may be relatively true or
false, it may arise from a narrow view or a broad
view, but it is equally potent whether true or false.
Demonstrable truth enters into our lives, scarcely
more than the mineral elements enter into our bodies,
but our lives could not go on for a moment without
them.
Religion is a sentiment, one of the most powerful
and absorbing that the human spirit knows, but that
it is or can be in any way related to science, or can
partake of the certitudes of science, is one of the mis-
takes that have cost the world untold suffering.
THE MYSTERIOUS BEETLE.
Mr. Peeper lives in Gotham. Being a learned
man and master of the microscope, he is employed as
an expert in the law courts, where his services are
very valuable, especially in criminal cases. For, besides
other things, he is able to tell, with certainty, the na-
ture of stains : he easily distinguishes the blood of man
from the blood of pigeons or other creatures. In spite
of his great learning, or because of it, he has one fault;
he considers nothing settled until it has been examined
under the microscope ; and whatever does not admit
of a microscopic inspection he regards as lying beyond
the ken of science.
Mr. Peeper's neighbor is Professor Sage, a teacher
in the High School. The Professor's hobby is logic,
and he is so astute that he can split hairs of thought
and make the finest distinctions in the philosophical
meanings of words. But, like his friend, he considers
nothing true unless it be demonstrated with rigid for-
malism according to some syllogistic figure. He is
able to stretch nearly everything upon some of the
Procrustean beds of logical deduction or induction, and
that which he cannot reduce to this treatment is re-
garded by him as unknowable.
They admire each other and agree very much in
their scientific and philosophical v^iews, although they
differ in their methods of investigation. The difference
of their methods seemed to increase their friendship,
for each, as a rule, submitted willingly, although some-
times not without a slight mental reservation, to the
authority of the other, whenever the subject lay in the
province of his special field.
"There is a new fangled philosophy," said the Pro-
fessor one day to his friend. " Its maxims are formu-
lated in two Isms. It calls itself Positivism, because
it takes the facts of experience to start with ; and Mon-
ism, because a systematic arrangement of facts is
looked upon as the aim of cognition : Thus knowledge
is regarded as a description of facts, and philosophy
becomes a unitary world-conception. What do you
think of this view ? "
"All philosophies," said Mr. Peeper, "are in my
opinion idle, and their study a waste of time."
" All philosophies ? " asked the Professor sharply.
"Yes, all," he repeated,—adding slowly and in a
considerate mood, "except agnosticism."
"Ah! I should say so!" rejoined the logician
with unconcealed satisfaction.
"Well," continued the microscopist, "did you not
tell me yourself : the gist of agnosticism is the idea
that the world-problem is an inscrutable, an absolutely
incomprehensible mystery ? Ergo, all philosophies,
all world- schemes, except that one which denies the
possibility of any world-scheme, must be failures from
the beginning."
Mr. Peeper always evaded controversies with his
friend, for he knew that he could not hold his own in
argument against him. Agreeing upon the whole with
him on the question of agnosticism, he kept, never-
theless, detailed explanations of his own view for him-
self ; for he felt that his explanations might show
divergencies which he did not care to discuss ; they
might reveal such a radical difference of opinion that
the harmony of their souls might be destroyed. Mr.
Peeper did not believe in philosophising at all. He
thought by himself, "Theories and world-schemes
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cannot be placed under the microscope ; they are mere
fancies. Thus they must be regarded as outside the
realm of science. Accordingly, they are not fit objects
for scientific investigation."
Mr. Peeper was much more of an agnostic than his
friend the logician, for he doubted even the absolute
reliability of the syllogism, and believed that man
knows nothing beyond what is revealed to him through
the microscope. He was not even sure of the agnostic
doctrine that the world-mystery is utterly incompre-
hensible. Thus he resembled the old philosopher
Pyrrho who was so consistent in his scepticism that
he doubted his own doubt.
'
' Positivism, " said the logician, ' ' is not only crude,
but also illogical, fo start with facts, what a propo-
sition ! What can we do with facts unless we have
theories concerning them or at least methods of how to
deal with them ? We cannot do anything with facts
without having principles. We must first have prin-
ciples. Positivism derives principles and everything
from facts, without considering that in doing so it pre-
supposes certain principles. The problem is whence
do the principles come? And, then, positivism as-
sumes facts without proving them ! Facts are exactly
the mystery of the world. For instance, now I look
at you, I see you, I have a sensation of sight. This
sensation is a fact. So far, all right, but the positivists
forget that facts cannot be proved. Facts must be
proved. How can anybody prove that I have a sen-
sation ? Here lies the problem. That is a mystery,
and the mystery will remain unsolved forever."
"You are right," said Mr. Peeper. " The whole
world consists of facts, and, supposing we know every-
thing that science can discover, we should have to
confess that all facts are equally mysterious." He
paused forafew moments. Then, he continued, "Even
this general statement is mysterious. For ' myste-
rious ' is a relative term. The mysterious presupposes
the comprehensible. Light and shade, obscurity and
clearness go together. There are no shades in impene-
trable darkness, and if the existence of all facts is
absolutely mysterious, there would after all be no mys-
tery in the existence of facts."
One day the microscopist called at the close of the
school for the Professor to take a stroll with him through
the park before going home. He found his friend
surrounded by a number of boys, all of them absorbed
in a deep problem. The Professor of natural science
had fallen ill, and Professor Sage had taken his
place pro tem. Professor Sage tried to conceal the
fact, but the boys knew that he was not very familiar
with natural science, and so they enjoyed puzzling
him with questions. One of them had produced a
queer bug, it was no dragon fly, no spider, no bumble-
bee, yet it resembled each of these insects.
The Professor appeared to be greatly puzzled when
his friend entered. Mr. Peeper noticed at once the
perplexing situation and when the Professor showed
him the strange creature, Mr. Peeper took out of his
pocket a capsule which he generally carried about him,
put the bug in the capsule, and cut off all further dis-
cussion by the promise that he would investigate it
under the microscope.
In the park they met the gardener of the conser-
vatories. They showed him the rare specimen, and
asked him whether he knew what it was.
"Yes," said the gardener with assurance, and the
Professor was delighted at the prospect of receiving
information. "Yes," said the gardener "that is a
bug."
The Professor was disappointed.^ "My dear friend,
"
said he, "you do not see the depth of the problem.
We know very well that the creature is a bug ; but of
what kind, what family, what species?" He turned
away sadly, thinking, "This man pretends to know
something, and he knows nothing. How much more
arrogant is the conceit that we can know something
where the wisest minds must confess that we know
nothing. It takes all the wisdom of the ages to under-
stand that at bottom all knowledge is impossible."
When the two friends arrived at Mr. Peeper's home,
he placed the unknown bug under the microscope.
" Strange," he said. " The wings are those of a dragon
fly. His head looks like a grasshopper's head, His
hind body reminds one of the bumble-bee. I fear this
creature is a very mysterious being. I wonder how it
can exist at all ? Its existence is illogical and self-
contradictory.
"
" But it is a fact," said the Professor. "There it is."
"Yes, it is a fact. There it is," replied Mr. Peeper
musingly. "There it lies before us in its undeniable
presence. But, after all, what does that amount to?"
he added, with a sarcastic twinkle in his eye. "A fact
is only a fact. Facts cannot be proved. They are all
equally mysterious. It seems to me that the whole
world, being an incomprehensible mystery, is like this
bug. The whole world is mysterious. It is, for aught
I know, as illogical and unintelligible as this little
bug."
Mr. Peeper enjoyed, for the first time in his life, a
superiority in discussing a subject with his friend.
The Professor, who was so confident when engaged
in a dispute on logical topics, was at sea in natural
science. Mr. Peeper was much better informed in en-
tomology than Professor Sage.
"Well," said the Professor, hesitatingly, "what
shall I tell the boys to morrow when they ask for the
name of this mysterious beetle?"
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"That bug is a rare specimen," said Mr. Peeper,
" and indeed, excellently made by the creator who
shaped him. But this wondrous world in which we
live is faulty, why should not a bug have his faults
too. Just look through the microscope and you will
see the mucilage with which these heterogeneous parts
are pasted together. If the boys ask you to-morrow
what kind of a creature it is, tell them it is 'a humbug,'
—and that is the reason why it is so mysterious."
p. c.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE GOD-IDEA.
BY C. STANILAND WAKE.
M. LE CoMTE Goblet d'Alviella has published in Paris at
Felix Alcan's (Bruxelles, at Th. Falk's; Chicago, at Ackermann
and Eyller's) a work entitled "L'Idee de Dieu d'apres lAQthropol-
ogie et '1 Histoire."
The brilliant author of this exhaustive treatise of the God-idea
was studying the question of the development of the later forms of
religion from ideas current among peoples in lower stages of cul-
ture, to form a supplement to his work on contemporary re-
ligious evolution among the English, the Americans, and the Hin-
dus, when he was asked by the trustees of the Ilihlurl Foundation
to give one of their annual series of lectures. This invitation was
accepted, and M. d'Alviella determined to take for his subject the
historical evolution "of the God-idea. To give effect to such a
scheme, however, it was necessary to give a much wider meaning
to the term history than it usually has, and to bring within its
scope much that is regarded as strictly prehistoric. This was ab-
solutely necessary if the lecturer's idea was to be carried out, and
as there can be no evolution without continuity, it is requisite to
go back to the very beginnings of human culture to show the ori-
gin of the God-idea, which runs as a thread throughout the whole
course of religious development.
By religion M. d'Alviella understands the mode in which man
realises his relations with superhuman and mysterious powers on
which he thinks himself dependent. This definition leaves open
the question whether the end of religion is real or a mere shadow.
The author thinks it is real, and that the word God contains the
imperishable conception of " a Superhuman Power who, realising
himself according to law, is revealed to man in the voice of con-
science and in the spectacle of the universe." This is the truth
which persists when, " after having stripped the Deity of his orig-
inal superfetations and of his parasitic accretions, after having re-
moved from him, as so many borrowed garments, his anthropo-
morphic attributes and his moral limitations, after, finally, having
restored his nature to unity and his action to harmony, we find
ourselves in presence of the impenetrable veil which will always
conceal it from us in its essence and in its grandeur, but which
arrests the passage neither of the manifestations of its power nor
of the revelations of its law, nor perhaps the mysterious radiation
of an attractive force answering to our terms of sympathy and
love."
There are three delusions, says M. d'Alviella, under which
the conception of a superhuman power has been gradually arrived
at: (i) The abusive extension of personality, (2) the confusion of
coincidence with causality, and (3) the assimilation of dreaming
with reality.
The abusive extension of personality is supposed to have been
due to the fact that the savage, like the animal, regards all move-
ment as the sign of life. Hence man came to personify everything
that appears to move, and, by extension, everything that seemed
to exercise on his destiny an influence implying the exercise of an
active will. It is doubtful, however, whether this goes far enough,
and it is probable that, as the author at one time thought, man at
first regarded as animated "everything which affects his senses
with an individuality sufficiently pronounced to awaken in his
mind a distinct image." The primitive notion of the transmigra-
tion of souls, as preserved in popular Buddhism is consistent with
that view, as is also the fact that the Australian aborigines divide
all things in nature into two categories which appear to answer to
male and female. To the savage, man is the standard for nature,
and everything therefore is animated like himself.
As to the confusion between coincidence and causality, there
can be no doubt that this delusion has had great influence over
the uncultured mind. As the author shows, objects are accident-
ally associated with events, of which they are inconsistently sup-
posed to be the cause, and thus they attain a personification, it
this had not been previously ascribed to them. The influence of
dreams during sleep is as great as that of the waking imagination.
His experiences during these two conditions are to the savage
equally real, a fact which must effect greatly his ideas in relation
to duplication of personality and its continuance after death. It
would be a mistake, however, to suppose, as the author does, that
the killer had its origin in dreams. These might supply the con-
ditions of a future state of existence, but not the idea of it. If the
savage ascribes life to inanimate objects, why should he not con-
ceive of his own life continuing, notwithstanding the apparent
ce.ssation of motion ? Originally man could have no idea of death,
but would, as M. d'Alviella himself says, at first confound it with
sleep, fainting, and catalepsy. The connection between the be-
lief in a future existence and the worship of ancestors is evident,
but in its developed form the ancestral cult is undoubtedly of
comparatively late origin. The author thinks that it was devel-
oped on parallel lines with the worship of natural objects, and it is
quite possible that the fear of the spirits with which man's imagi-
nation filled nature, and the dread of the spirits of the dead may
have originated together. It is, indeed, far from improbable that
originally they were one and the same, and that the spirits with
which the human mind peopled nature were those of departed
generations of men, although this would probably never be actu-
ally recognised, and they would finally come to be clearly distin-
guished.
The earliest prayers and the earliest rites were offered to the
principal objects of nature regarded as "quasi human personali-
ties. " The former were for the obtaining of blessings, but the
latter would be rather for the working of evils. Sacrifice appears
to have combined both these notions, and the author seems to
think the primitive idea on which it was based was that of reci-
procity. Generosity in offerings requires generosity in return, and
a similar notion gives rise to peace offerings and expiatory sacri-
fices. Sorcery is based on the opinion that supernatural powers
can be influenced by incantations, and that spirits sometimes in-
juriously affect human beings, as in sickness. Magical processes
and divination have a similar origin. M. d'Alviella asks whether
conjuration preceded propitiation, and he replies that probably
they have coexisted since the time that man first felt the necessity
of putting himself in communication with the personified forces of
nature. It is more probable, however, that propitiation in its sim-
plest form, as intended to avert evil, preceded conjuration, as the
fear of spirits must have preceded the thought of making use of
them.
The subject of po/yi/emonism, under which term is comprised
spiritism, fetishism and idolatry, is well treated. The author
states that in the veneration of natural objects, worship is ad-
dressed to the personality with which they are invested. More-
over, this personality is conceived under the form of a double sep-
arable from its envelope, by analogy with the human personality.
Thus the distinction of body and soul is coextensive with the whole
range of personified nature, a tact which has perhaps even a more
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important bearing on the subsequent developments of religious
belief than the author ascribes to it. He points out the intimate
connection of spiritism with fetishism, which supposes that a
spirit can dwell outside of a body, and he shows that an idol is
merely a perfected form of the fetish, and not a symbol as it is
often asserted. Idolatry thus constitutes a progress, a develop-
ment from a simpler cult, and it elf exhibits various stages of pro-
gress.
We are told that polytheism, although based on polydemon-
ism, is the result of a process of differentiation among superhuman
powers. Those that were supposed to concern themselves the
least with the affairs of men fell into the background, and pre-
ponderance was thus given to four categories of demons, those
which were thought to control the principal natural phenomena,
tribal spirits, the souls of the illustrious dead, and the powers
which represented social collectivities. This differentiation was
attended with the establishment of a hierarchy which implied the
subordination of the spirits to the gods, and which naturally im-
itated the hierarchy established among earthly powers. M d'Al-
viella after tracing the existence of such divine societies among
various peoples, remarks that " it is interesting to show that every-
where there was a consciousness of the spontaneous parallelism
established between the celestial kingdom and the terrestrial state.
But by an optical illusion, it was the human society which seemed
the imitation of the divine state." We have here, however, only
another illustration of the truth, that man has ever been prone to
see in the reflections from his own mind external realities and, we
may add, often to invest them with supernatural attributes.
In the passage from polytheism to monism there has generally
been the development of a form of dualism. There has always
existed in the mind of the savage a distinction betv;een good and
evil spirits, and the author sees in mythology, by which he under-
stands "the transformation of natural phenomena or of abstract
events into personal adventures which are ascribed to superhuman
beings," a means by which could be formed the idea that the gods
were actively concerned in the well-being of humanity. He
speaks of this as the regulative mission of divinity, the object of
which was to establish order in nature, and thus organise one of
the conditions essential to the preservation of mankind. The gods
thus came to represent the beneficent power of nature who are op-
posed in their mission by the hostile superhuman powers. This
dualism becomes the more marked as religious development pro-
ceeds, but the final triumph of order is always recognised. This
belief led to the formation in the human mind of the idea of law,
of a cosmical order based on the regularity of natural phenomena.
It resulted, moreover, in the restriction of the domain left to di-
vine arbitrariness. The personifications of natural order were
placed above the ancient gods, who finally gave place to a supreme
author and sustainer of cosmical order.
M. d'Alviella points out that the conflict for order in nature
was accompanied by a contest for moral order. This may seem to
be opposed to the immorality of the actions ascribed to the gods
in the ancient myths, but this is explained, and we think properly,
by the fact that at the beginning of religious evolution morality
has no place in the conception of the gods ; "ethics and religion
are absolutely independent of each other." But a conception of
moral order is gradually formed on the plan of the cosmical order ;
that which agrees with this order is good and what is in opposi-
tion to it is evil. Thus, says the author, " is everywhere estab-
lished a sort of assimilation between the forces which represent,
on the one side, light, life, order, truth and justice; on the other
side, darkness, death, disorder, untruth and unrighteousness. The
drama which, until then, confines itself to nature extends to the
conscience, and man is more than ever sensible of the duty to co-
operate with the gods who fight for the good of the world." The
connection of these ideas with that of a future life of retribution
or recompense, for evil done or suffered in the present through vio-
lation of the divine order, is evident ; as is the relation between the
" moralisation of the divine type" and the improvement in the
moral conduct of man, who comes to be governed by the ideas of
duty and love ascribed to the deity.
The author appears to have lost sight of one important feat-
ure. In polydemonism the distinction between the soul and the
body is always preserved. In the later dualism this distinction is
not lost sight of, but it takes on another aspect. In its cosmology
the soul becomes spirit and the body, matter, and in the antago-
nism between light and darkness, we have the conflict between
spirit and matter as the latest phase of dualism, which profoundly
affected the monotheistic religions, including Christianity itself.
Monolotry was founded, as M. d'Alviella states, on the belief
in the superiority of the national God, and the more a nation was
able to extend its authority the more its supreme deity approached
the position of universal sovereignty. To this was added the idea
of the Deity being a father, as well as the ruler, of his people.
We cannot follow the author further in his description of the
transformations undergone by the God-idea, under the influence
of metaphysical speculation, until it becomes the "eternal energy
from which all things proceed," and "the power that makes for
righteousness"
;
two well-known formulse which he thinks furnish
" the point of contact between the philosophy of evolution and the
religious school of positivism, by allowing these two systems to
complete each other without abandoning their respective princi-
ples.
"
Let us see, in conclusion, what are M. d'Alviella's ideas as to
the future of religion. He says that three motives which have
from the first constituted the principal factors of religion are fear,
admiration, and sympathy. Of these motives the first two tended
to be absorbed in the third, which gave rise to a sentiment of fra-
ternity, engendered by communion in God, and a disinterested
desire to participate in the divine work of human regeneration.
This evolution of the religious sentiment, which was accompanied
by changes in the inferior elements of worship, such as prayer,
sacrifice, symbolism, the priesthood, led to the belief that the ser-
vice of humanity is the best mode of serving the Deity.
But if so, he asks, may not religious worship disappear ?
In considering this question, the author refers to the ethical
movement, whose founders have "sought to establish the bond of
their communion on the sole identity of humanitarian and pro-
gressive aspirations," but which he thinks will fail to satisfy the
aspirations of man towards the infinite and the absolute, through
not appealing to the resources of the combinations of art which
enter into worship to symbolise the aesthetic side of the ideal.
CURRENT TOPICS.
On the nth of July the President of the United States made
a few remarks before the National Educational Association, as-
sembled at Saratoga. Of course, any public address made by a
President who happens to be a candidate, will be open to suspicion
as an electioneering plea ; but whatever may be the campaign mo-
tive of it, the speech delivered at Saratoga was admirable in taste,
quality, and diction. Also, it abounded in good sense. The Pres-
ident said, " It is quite as appropriate, I think, that the President
of the United States should review the teachers of the land as that
he should review its army or its militia. " This was a novel view
of it, and a good one, but the chief merit of it lay in its dignity.
The President was careful to describe his office by its lawful name,
and himself by his constitutional title. He called himself the Pres-
ident of the United States, like a man proud of his civic rank.
He was no cheap, diluted, 'umble " chief executive," but the Pres-
ident of the United States. Let us hope that the vulgar, disre-
spectful, weak, and illegitimate equivocation, "chief executive''
will now be banished from American speech. I have been trying
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for years to abolish it, but with poor success, because the fear of
honest words has made us cowardly in speech, and we prefer to
use ambiguous phrase instead of single words that have no double
meaning. If we must say "chief executive" let us add the word
"magistrate" and thus rescue the phrase from the bondage of
literary slang. Even then, we shall not fully describe the Presi-
dent, for while he is the chief executive magistrate, he is also more
than that ; he has a veto on legislation, and he has other preroga-
tives not belonging to the executive department of the government.
Now that the President has himself set the example will our peo-
ple, and especially our newspapers, follow it and outlaw the "chief
executive " ?
* *
The President, in his address to the teachers, had something
sensible to say about practical education, and especially the educa-
tion of young children. He said ; " There is a just mean between
a system of intellectual competition which destroys the body, and
a system of physical training that eliminates the mind. Perhaps
the stress is applied too early upon our little ones." There is, as
they say in the President's own State, a " heap " of sense in that
;
but where is the "just mean," and how shall we discover it ? The
President spoke of two little girls whom he heard in conversation
outside the school house near his own home. One of them said,
" I had an awful dream last night." The other said, " What was
it?" and the dreamer answered, "Oh, I dreamt that I did not
pass." There is a touch of nature there that appeals to every
father and to every mother ; and the lesson of it applies to most of
us. It is not a month gone since I heard something similar to that.
In the street where I live, in the very same house in fact, if you
want to be critically exact, a little girl just eight years old, came
home from school on the last day of the term in a state of great
excitement, and shouted to an old man, thus, "Oh, Grandpa !
GrandpaM News ! News ! Great news I have for you ! " " What
is it ? " said the old man. " I passed ! " replied the child. It may
be said that the exultation was too great a strain on the nervous
system of the child, especially as it was a reaction from the anxiety
of many days. Perhaps so ; but what are we to do ? Our children
must go to school ; and while the nervous forces ought not to be
weakened or wasted, they ought to be kept healthy by exercise,
and by the stimulus of ambition. Perhaps it would be well to
abolish all general and periodic examinations for promotion in the
schools, so that the advancement of one child might not be the
public humiliation of another.
That the mental discipline acquired at the schools tends to
refine mere physical bravery into moral heroism is very likely true,
and the President appeared to be of that opinion, for he referred
in proof of it to a battle scene which came under his own observa-
tion. He said, " I recall a battle scene. The line was advancing
against an intrenched enemy ; from behind strong parapets eight
double-shotted guns belched forth their missiles of death into the
advancing line ; there was a pause that threatened instant retreat,
when a stripling soldier, a mother's boy, stepped to the front and
with cap in hand cheered the line on to victory." This was a
splendid achievement which ought to have put the name of that
"stripling soldier " high up on the "scroll of fame"; but in a
tantalising way, as is the habit of some story tellers, the President,
although he was there at the time, and saw the chivalrous charge,
provokingly neglects to tell us the name of the " stripling soldier,"
or the name of that battle which he won. Will the President
kindly finish the story, and tell us what the generals, and the colo-
nels, and the captains were about while the "stripling soldier"
was leading their troops against the strong parapets defended by
double-shotted guns ? Were they preparing to retreat, or had they
already gone ? The President himself, I am happy to say, had
not yet left, because he was present somewhere handy, and saw
the "stripling soldier" lead the charge. And, merely for the
rectification of history, nothing more, will the President give us
the name of the general who got credit for the victory won by that
" mother's boy " ?
* *
Lord Chief Justice Norbury who flourished in Ireland nearly
a hundred years ago, was called "the hanging judge" because of
his great efficiency in sending men to the scaffold. One day, hav-
ing sentenced a man to death, he ended with the usual benedic-
tion, "May the Lord have mercy on your soul"; to which the
prisoner answered, " Small thanks to your lordship for -that same
;
I never knew any man to thrive after /o?(?- prayers. " Sinis-
ter blessings are unlucky
; as, for instance, those bestowed upon
the President of the United States by Mr. Andrew Carnegie of
Cluny Castle, Scotland. "The American people know a good
thing when they get it. Heartiest congratulations
; you deserve
this triumph." Better for the President, if instead of this crooked
compliment he had heard the grim and ghastly raven croaking.
Nevermore. The flatteries given by Carnegie, and accepted by
the President, are stained by the blood of workmen slain on the
battle field of labor. The spirit shown by the workingmen of
Homestead, in resisting the Pinkerton invaders, will make their
fight heroic in history like the fight on Bunker Hill. In mimicry
of George the Third, Mr. Carnegie, at a safe distance, hires from
the Grand Duke of Hesse, Pinkerton mercenary legions to subju-
gate the aspiring laborers at Homestead, As we think of this grim
parody the lines of Ferdinand Freiligrath ring in our ears like
bells :
" The bullet in the marble breast, the gash upon the brow.
You raised us on the bloody planks with wild and wrathful vow !
High in tlie air you lifted us, that every writhe of pain
Might be an endless curse to him at whose word we were slain I
That he might see us in the gloom, or in the daylight's shine,
Whether he turns his Bible's leaf, or quaffs his foaming wine I "
It has come to this at last that any man made of money, and
out of jail, no matter how coarse his moral fibre, nor how impu-
dent his flunkey spirit, may patronise the President of the United
States with complimentary slang. He may even annoint the Amer-
ican people with flatteries fawning and insincere, receiving thanks
and gifts for his cajoleries. With a cunning leer in his eye, show-
ing that he is making fun of the American people, a canny Scot,
gold-plated by the taxation of Americans, prints a book full of
rant and fustian in praise of a " triumphant democracy " which
gives millions of dollars to him, and a few baubees to his men.
The offering of this cheap incense is offensive enough, but it is
humiliating to see the proud American spirit stoop to recerve the
counterfeit adulation of a mere speculator in American bounties,
a guest of this free land whose life and daily actions prove that' he
is morally and mentally incompetent even to understand the ge-
nius, intent, and promise of American democracy. What will the
world think of us for allowing ourselves to be wheedled by a pre-
tender whose only claim to notice is that he chinks when he walks
upon the ground ! It is arrogance, vulgar and intolerable, that
such a man by grace of money alone, should presume to counte-
nance and befriend the President of the United States. The fa-
miliarity drags the President down to the lower plane occupied by
his patron ; and it is natural to imagine a reciprocity of compli-
ments between them. Does the President think that the American
people knew a good thing when they got Mr. Carnegie ? And will
he send him heartiest congratulations for his triumph at Home-
stead ? And will the President further tell him that he deserved
this triumph ? It is worth a good deal of money over there in
Europe to a returned emigrant that he is on terms of intimate
friendship with the President of the United States ; and when
a crafty fellow can ostentatiously present a keg of Scotch whiskey
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to the President, and have it accepted, his importance rises thirty
degrees in the social thermometer ; because the people in the old
country think that any man who would dare to take such a lib-
erty must be on terms of the most intimate friendship and associa-
tion with the President. It is due to the dignity of his own coun-
trymen that the President of the United States be careful how he
gives dignity to merely opulent men. M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
God's Image in Man. By Henry U^ood. Boston : Lee and
Shepard, 1892.
The author of this work, whose recent articles in the Avt'na
Magazine attracted considerable attention and have been incorpo-
rated in the book, claims for his studies that they are glimpses
through the vision of the intuitive faculty, that is, "interpreta-
tions of the inner consciousness, rather than an intellectual or
argumentative effort." The objection to books of this kind is that
the teachings of intuition, so-called, can have no authority unless
they are confirmed by reason. While therefore we can sympathise
with the author when he says that he has no purpose other than
the plain unfoldment of truth and the delineation of living realities,
we cannot accept his statement that "the cultivated human intui-
tion has something of that exactness and perfection of which
instinct on the lower plane.-; of life is a prophecy." In fact instinct
as we know it is the expression of past experience, and although the
value of experience depends on its being a representation of the
laws of nature, these can become known only through the exercise
of reason. Reason, therefore, and not intuition is the real source
of our recognition of truth. This view excludes all modes of
revelation but the operations of nature itself ; and except so far as
what the author refers to as "Direct Revelation," "Biblical Rev-
elation," and "Revelation through the Son," can receive a natural
interpretation, that is, can be indorsed by reason, it must be
rejected. The following sentence sets forth concisely Mr. Wood's
views: "If we would listen intently we might hear the divine
voice within assuring us that God is our life ; that spirit is the
only substantial entity, and that love is the only law." All turns
here on the meaning to be given to the term "spirit," and we can
well believe that most of those who agree with the author, that
"nature is God translated into vitalised color, form, and beauty,"
that is, nature as known to us, would be able to accept the views
set forth in the above sentence if they were allowed to define
" spirit " in their own way. The book contains much that is good,
but its supernatural element vitiates most of its contents. Evolution
may be a revelation, but a great deal of allegory will be required
to briog the teachings of bible history into consonance with it.
a.
Anthropology as a Science and as a Branch of University
Education. By Daniel G. Brinton. Philadelphia : 1892.
By this pamphlet the well-known American Anthropologist,
Dr. Brinton, makes an appeal to institutions for higher education
in this country, for the establishment of chairs of anthropology in
their faculties of philosophy. A simple professorship, with courses
of lectures, would not be sufficient, however, to carry out what the
author proposes, and he states, in fact, that the rightful claims of
the science he advocates will be recognised only "when it is
organised as a department by itself, with a competent corps of
professors and docents, with well-appointed laboratories and mu-
seums, and with fellowships for deserving students." This is an
extensive scheme, but in this way only can so important a science
as that of anthropology, with its four subdivisions of somatology,
ethnology, ethnog raphy, and archeology, be properly cultivated.
The arrangement of subjects thus made by Dr. Brinton is a good
one, and it will, we think, recommend itself to anthropologists
both in this country and in Europe; where ethnologists have
ceased to claim a position of superiority owing to their having
been the first in the field. S^.
NOTES.
When Mr. John Burroughs in his article on "Religious
Truth" in this number of The Open Com-/ says: "Religion is a
sentiment, one of the most powerful and absorbing that the human
spirit knows, but that it is or can be in any way related to science,
or can partake of the certitudes of science, is one of the mistakes
that have cost the world untold suffering," he uses the word
"religion" partly in the sense of creed, and means, as we judge
from the tendencies of his article, that the formulations and doc-
trines of religious creed are not. in virtue of being religious, for
that reason scientific and absolute truths. In so far as they spring
from sentiment they may not be truths and may not partake of the
certitudes of science, but in so far as the religions of the earth
have all builded alike and have all gone to the same quarry for
their material, to the quarry of facts, their creations are truths
and will stand the test of scientific examination. Both religion
and ethics have an objective aspect as well as the subjective aspect
to which Mr. Burroughs refers, and this objective aspect is cer-
tainly a domain of scientific investigation. Whether individiia/s
agree with the results of scientific criticism in this domain, is of as
little consequence as whether they agree with the doctrine of the
rotation of the earth on its axis.
MR. C. S. PEIRCE has resumed tiis lessons by correspondence in the
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